

ASSESSING THE PROSPECTS FOR PARLIAMENTARY
DEVELOPMENT IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

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INTRODUCTION

This paper tries to set the context for understanding how institutional development can strengthen the role of parliament in contributing to a system of good governance in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is argued that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly's ability to contribute to good governance is hindered by the absence of a prior history of statehood/autonomy and prior democratic templates to guide it. It is further hindered by the absence of national unity. Only once we have set these problems in context, can we identify ways in which the international community can target its resources towards strengthening the role of institutions.

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT'S CONTRIBUTION TO DEMOCRATIZATION

Institutional development and democratization are closely related, but different terms. I would argue that the field of institutional development aims to strengthen the role of state institutions, including the executive and legislative branches, in contributing to a system of good governance. Governance, as defined by the United Nations Development Program, is the:

exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.¹

Democratization, or the consolidation of democracy, is a function of interrelated socio-economic (such as standard of living), cultural (such as a strong civil society) and institutional variables. By the latter I mean that certain institutional variations (such as a parliamentary rather than a semi-presidential or presidential political system) are more conducive to long-term democratic sustainability than others.² The success or failure of democratization is larger than any one institutional development initiative. For example, the countries in which we work have already designed their institutional forms, so we do not have the ability to affect their design.

PLACING PARLIAMENTS' ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE

This is not the forum to ponder the relationship between democracy and good governance. Suffice to say that the ability of parliaments to contribute to good governance in Eastern Europe depends upon the existence of a prior democratic history and prior statehood (or degree of autonomy). National unity is the third criterion. Each of these criteria is discussed below.

Statehood/autonomy

Prior statehood entails significant experience as an independent state. Autonomy implies a certain level of *de facto* independence from the federal government. In Eastern Europe, statelessness and lack of autonomy is associated with a lack of usable institutional

infrastructure. Prior statehood is important because with statehood comes institutions with real decision-making powers and competent administrative elites capable of serving the state. In the USSR, ‘decision-making’ (in quotes because they were actually rubber-stamps) bodies were never taken seriously. Obviously, such institutions did not attract the best and the brightest, or the connected. Rather, the movers and shakers were invited to work in Moscow, where the real decisions were made. Upon the collapse of the USSR, the Soviet successor states inherited these weak institutions along with the lack of human resources and experience to run these institutions effectively. In Yugoslavia, “the federal units enjoyed quasi-confederal autonomy,” under the 1974 Constitution.³ In some cases, institutional autonomy facilitated the construction of new democratic political institutions. In others, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, the authoritarian state concentrated power in the hands of a few political elites, thereby constricting the potential gains that could have arisen from autonomy.

In countries without a recent and lengthy history of *de facto* statehood, parliament will be preoccupied in the first few years of its country’s independence with battles over the future of the state (policy orientation, state symbols), and solving crises rather than focusing on democratization, strengthening its institutions or engaging in economic reform. Ukraine, stateless throughout most of its history (during the 20th century it was independent in 1918 for two years⁴), spent five years deciding on its constitutional structures. Bulgaria, a country with a history of statehood dating back to 1908 (following 500 years of domination by the Ottoman Empire), had resolved its constitutional issues two years after the resignation of the Bulgarian Communist Party in 1989.

A prior democratic history

As Geoffrey Pridham argues, “new democracies are by definition fragile democracies.” They are “vulnerable to collapse” and where they do not collapse “involve a lengthy and complicated process of transition.”⁵ As Samuel Huntington argues in the “Third Wave”, democratic reversals are quite common during the first attempt at democratization. In the first wave of democratization, which lasted from 1820-1926, there were 29 democracies in the world. This number was reduced to 12 by 1942 during the first wave of democratic reversals (i.e., reverse wave). By the height of the second wave (1962), 36 countries were democracies; this number had declined to 30 by 1973. The third wave of democracy, which began with democratization in Latin America and Southern Europe in the 1980s, had extended to Eastern Europe in the 1990s.⁶ Many countries required more than one attempt to establish a sustainable democratic regime. While in the 1980s less than 30% of countries had democratic regimes, by 2000, this number had skyrocketed to more than 60% of governments produced by “some form of open, fair and competitive elections”.⁷ Granted that this is a minimalist definition of democracy.

Two arguments are relevant here. First, much of the literature on democratic stability has, since the 1970s, been arguing that democracy is about institutionalizing forums for the resolution of conflict. Democracy is not based only on playing by the rules of the game. Consider Rustow’s statement that “politics consists not only of competition for office. It is, above all, a process for resolving conflicts within human groups—whether these arise from the clash of interests or from uncertainty about the future.” Democracy involves a process of “trial and error”, and the learning experience of democracy therefore depends on encouraging opposing political forces and elites to submit “major questions to resolution by democratic

procedure.”⁸ It would seem that the more experience a country has with solving problems democratically, the more it is able to institutionalize conflict resolution practices. There appears to be some evidence that when institutional instability is the cause (or one of the causes) of democratic collapse (i.e., a reverse wave), countries that re-democratize in the next wave attempt to develop political institutions that will avoid such instability. This is part of the “trial and error” process. Just one case in point would be the provision in the Federal Republic of Germany’s Basic Law that votes of non-confidence can only take place if the parliament can agree on a successor. Known as the “constructive vote of non-confidence”, this mechanism is designed to avoid the instability (manifested through frequent turnovers in government and elections) that plagued the pre-World War II Weimar Republic and led to its collapse.⁹

Second, there are advantages to a second attempt at democracy. Countries with some previous experience in democratic governance, despite suffering setbacks in a reverse wave, are more likely to consolidate their democratic regimes during their second attempt. Many, if not most of the countries that had limited inter-war democracies in Eastern Europe had parliaments at the time. The prior experience and tradition of parliamentarism provided institutional memory that would prove useful when they adopted democratic political systems in the early 1990s. Rather than invent a political regime from scratch, these countries looked back to the democratic institutions that existed during the interwar period as a template for designing their political systems. I would argue that this institutional history increases the ability of parliaments to contribute to good governance. If the right leadership is in place, more time can be devoted to economic and political reform—energies are not diverted trying to devise democratic institutions for the first time.

National unity

In contrast to the two historical criteria presented above, the current state of national unity speaks to the fact that “the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to.”¹⁰ Where populations are divided and uncertain, it is likely that political elites will be too. Lack of national unity comes in different shapes and sizes. In countries of the former USSR, lack of national unity is not so much manifested through crippling ethnic tensions (although there are many Chechnyas), but rather a split between those who support their country’s ongoing independence and those that support integration with Russia or a revival of the USSR. In the Balkans, lack of national unity is more pronounced, represented by deep ethnic and religious cleavages (among others) and hatreds dating back hundreds of years. A number of countries in the region, including Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, and Yugoslavia were engaged in bloody civil wars in the region in the 1990s. Despite the cessation of conflict, ethnic tensions often continue to threaten the very existence of the state. In fact, experience in the Balkans suggests that lack of national unity can actually discard the mitigating effects of prior statehood, as severe ethnic conflict divides the state and threatens its existence.

Table 1. Ranking of Countries by Statehood/autonomy, interwar democracy and national unity

Score	Countries	Prior statehood	Interwar democracy	National unity
3	Czech Republic	Y	Y	Y
2	Russia	Y	N	Y
1	Ukraine	N	N	Y (limited)
0	Bosnia-Herzegovina	N	N	N

PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT

In Eastern Europe, I would argue that parliament’s ability to contribute to good governance is based in part upon the extent to which the three factors mentioned above (the presence of national unity, a prior democratic history and prior statehood) are present in each countries’ history. Countries are ranked according to how many of these criteria they fulfill in table 1.

The higher the score, the more likely it is that parliament will contribute to good governance. To summarize, prior statehood implies the existence of a cadre of experienced elites able to assist in the governance of the nation. Prior history of democracy implies the presence of a homegrown formula for the functioning of democratic institutions, together with some experience in ‘getting the kinks out’ (i.e., learning from past experiences). National unity implies a focus of energy on battling over democratic and economic reforms, rather than over the very future of the state itself. However, there are other factors that help to explain variations between countries with the same score, such as the strength of civil society and its survival under the communist regimes, and the present institutional environment. These factors are not raised in this paper.

UNDERSTANDING PARLIAMENTS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Bosnia-Herzegovina has neither national unity, prior democratic history nor prior statehood. As such, I argue that the limited ability of the parliament (or any other institution) to contribute to good governance must be taken into account when designing institutional development programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

National unity

As I mentioned above, lack of national unity is clearly a crippling factor when it comes to the functioning of institutions in a democracy. The civil war that raged in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992-1995 resulted in more than 200,000 deaths, including ethnic cleansing, genocide and massive rapes. Two million people were driven from their homes. Not surprisingly, the effects of the most destructive conflict in Europe since World War II are still having ramifications on the governance of the state. First, the war ravaged the economy, damaging

60% of housing units in the Bosnian-Croat Federation (one of two entities, the other being the Republika Srpska), and reducing 90% of the population to dependency on humanitarian food aid. Rather than focusing on and dedicating resources to the building of a new state, funds were spent repairing damaged housing, urban infrastructure, roads, bridges and electrical generation. The World Bank alone had disbursed more than \$2.8 billion by May 1999 in reconstruction aid, just to bring the above-mentioned infrastructure back to (in many cases slightly below) pre-war levels.¹¹

Second, the tragic civil war has resulted in the creation of deeply divided political institutions, and lack of support and ownership among political elites for the existence of a multi-ethnic state. The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina is in effect the Dayton Accord of November 21, 1995 and subsequent treaty dated December 14, 1995. According to these documents, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was designed as a federal state, consisting of two entities or sub-units, namely a Muslim/Croat Federation and a Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srpska). According to one observer, the Constitution “makes the entities *de facto* mini states within an imaginary central state.”¹² This was necessary given the strong opposition to a centralized state. Most powers were delegated to the regional governments, including education, policing, taxation and public services. The national government is responsible for a limited range of jurisdictions, including defense, diplomatic and international economic matters. It does not have the power to levy taxes, and is entirely dependent upon the entities for contributions. In addition to a Presidency and Cabinet of Ministers, there is a bi-cameral legislature (the BiH Parliamentary Assembly or BiH PA), consisting of a 42-member House of Representatives and 15-member House of Peoples.¹³

Table 2. The BiH (Federal) Parliamentary Assembly

INSTITUTION	QUOTAS: TOTAL NO. OF REPRESENTATIVES	REPRESENTATION	
		Republika Srpska	Muslim-Croat Federation
House of Representatives	42	14	28 from Muslim-Croat Federation (14 from each)
(Method of selection)		Selection by Bosnian Serb National Assembly	Direct election by population
House of Peoples	15	5	10 (5 Muslims and 5 Croats)
(Method of selection)		Selection by Bosnian Serb National Assembly	Selection by Federation House of People

The Dayton Accord has left the federal political institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina in a state of paralysis and ineffectiveness, by inscribing ethnic cleavages (lack of national unity) into the Constitution. As Patrice McMahon states, “the constitution not only recognizes territorial

divisions but also ethnic quotas”¹⁴ (see table 2, above). Each of the three ethnic groups has a *de facto* veto over legislation, since decisions taken in either house of parliament can be blocked by one-third of the members of either house. McMahon argues that:

The quotas, together with the other provisions designed to limit the power of majorities, make it almost impossible to get things done. According to the Office of the High Representative (OHR) [in charge of civilian administration in Bosnia], approximately a quarter of every parliamentary session is wasted in squabbling about the agenda...The Parliamentary Assembly has passed some twenty laws, but only because the international community forced it to do so, and few of these laws have been implemented or enforced.¹⁵

Statehood/autonomy

According to McMahon, “many Westerners believe that the Bosnians are simply incapable of meeting the challenges of democratization and transition—that their ‘ethnic mentality’ combined with lack of experience in self-governance, has stacked the deck against the goals of Dayton.”¹⁶

Bosnia-Herzegovina was ruled by the Turks from 1463-1878, by the Austrians from 1878-1919, by the King of Serbia and the Serbian Aristocracy from 1919-1945 as part of the “First Yugoslavia” and by the communists as part of Yugoslavia from 1945-1991.¹⁷ From 1945-1991, Sarajevo was the capital of a Republic of the Yugoslav Federation. As a rule, Yugoslav Republics “clearly enjoyed vast political, cultural, and administrative autonomy.”¹⁸ The autonomy existed against a backdrop of tightly controlled authoritarian politics. Despite rapid autonomous economic and cultural development, Bosnia-Herzegovina was “rigidly governed”—“politics remained cadre driven, and the monopoly of a narrow circle of politicians.” When the Communist Party was cast aside in 1990 elections, “its broader social elites were without any experience in genuine power-sharing.”¹⁹ In effect, the potential gains from autonomy were erased by the concentration of power in the hands of the Bosnian Communists during its tenure as a Yugoslav Republic.

Second, the limited jurisdictions assigned to the federal level in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its dependency upon the entities for financing further weakens the effectiveness of the BiH PA. The institution is significantly understaffed, even vis-à-vis the entity parliaments. I can testify to the fact that the 50-or-so staff serving the BiH PA are deeply demoralized as a result of weak leadership and lack of experience in running a state institution, as well as the lack of interest members of parliament have in strengthening the parliamentary apparatus.

Third, and perhaps most important, a situation of dependency has been created by the fact that the Office of the High Representative (OHR) has “nearly unlimited authority, including the power to impose legislation and dismiss uncooperative public officials.” As McMahon argues, “today the international community is, in effect, running a protectorate in Bosnia, since the OHR is the supreme legislative and executive body.”²⁰ Together with the paralyzing quotas and veto powers provided by Dayton, the OHR, with its annual budget of \$30 billion dollars, staff of 600, and increasing powers, has undermined the authority of the state by making itself, not the parliament, the locus of power in the state. According to McMahon:

This “substitution effect” has made the OHR, rather than the Bosnian state, the locus for debate and decision-making. Opposition politicians, civil society organizations and even members of the government lobby the high representative for legislative reforms...International intervention, even when it has furthered some of the goals of Dayton, has simultaneously distorted the political process and undermined the Bosnian state.²¹

In short, lack of experience in running state institutions has been compounded by deep ethnic divisions that have resulted in a state run not for its citizenry, but rather for and by the three ethnic groups. State capacity is therefore growing at a snail’s pace.

*Absence of interwar democracy*²²

Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of six republics of authoritarian Yugoslavia (the others were Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro) that split apart during the disintegration of Yugoslavia. In 1990, prior to the collapse of Yugoslavia, the federal Yugoslav Communist Party split apart. The successor parties to the communists (i.e., rebranded communists) lost elections in four republics, including Slovenia and Croatia (March-April 1990), Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia (November-December 1990). They hung on in Serbia and Montenegro in December 1990. In Bosnia, the outcome of the 1990 republican elections was a governing coalition of three ethnically based parties generally equivalent to the three major ethnic groups (Muslims, Croats and Serbs).

These were the only free elections held in Bosnia prior to the implementation of the Dayton Accord. As David Chandler argues, many commentators have suggested that these elections demonstrate the failure of democracy, because nationalist parties won the day against liberal-reform and communist (even they were better than the nationalist) parties. 84% of the seats went to leading ethnic party organizations, with the liberal reform alliance picking up only 5.4% of the seats. Chandler argues that most commentators saw “the vote for nationalist parties counted merely as evidence of the inability of the Bosnian electorate to accept democracy and the values of civil society.” This type of argumentation suggests that the failure of democracy to take root was “the direct result of the mismatch between Bosnian ethnic culture and (the values of) liberal democracy, the electorate electing the wrong leaders who then used their control of the state institutions to create ‘collective paranoia.’”²³

I personally disagree with this line of argumentation, and subscribe to an alternate argument offered by some political scientists that the vote for nationalists was “a rational response to the uncertainties of Bosnia’s constitutional situation”. According to Chandler:

The 1990 elections took place as the Yugoslav state was fragmenting and the key political question was that of constitutional reform and a looser confederal arrangement. Without the security provided by the counterbalancing mechanisms of the federal state, questions of security became closely tied with those of ethnic or nationalist orientation. In Bosnia, the reform of the constitutional framework put to question the guarantees of security and equal treatment for the three ethnic groups

While the Muslims and Croats in the governing coalition supported independence for Bosnia-Herzegovina, most Bosnian Serbs were opposed. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence was declared by the Muslim-dominated Bosnian Assembly on February 29, 1992, with a 63% turnout and 90% vote of support. The Bosnian Serb community urged Bosnian Serbs to

boycott the vote. Most of the international community recognized its independence in April 1992, but the country was already slipping into a civil war, prompted in part by the Bosnian Serb declaration of an independent Serbian Republic.²⁴

The above synthesis demonstrates that the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 is in fact not a story of democratic reversal. Rather, it is more accurate to argue that a democratic system never had the chance to take root in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Where such traditions do not exist, it is extremely difficult for political leaders to pursue the building of democratic institutions in the presence of multiple nations, and high cultural diversity. In such a case, democracy falls by the wayside.²⁵

With no prior template for democratic governance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the first real attempt at democracy in Bosnia is Dayton—a constitutional roadmap prepared by the international community and imposed on the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is in this context that our institution-building efforts take place—in the context of deep and (as a result of Dayton) institutionalized ethnic cleavages and a nascent statehood overshadowed by a bloody and tragic civil war. These political institutions have had the unintended consequence of deepening rather than alleviating government by ethnicity. They are also eclipsed by a powerful international community (lead by the OHR), which can impose laws and dismiss politicians and public servants. It is hard to imagine any democracy becoming consolidated in this manner. How can domestic elites possibly take ownership over such a system in which they have limited control over the outcomes? Nonetheless, many commentators feel (rightly or jingoistically) that “the meddling Western ‘outsiders’...are far better representatives of the genuine interests of the Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian peoples and states than their patriotic leaders.” Put another way, “the people of Bosnia would be unable to make democracy without the international community regulating society.”²⁶

The members of the BiH PA significantly lack experience or the knowledge of the role of a parliamentarian—seminars held by the OSCE Democratization Unit in Sarajevo focus on such themes as “the role of members of parliament” and “the importance of parliamentary committees”. Experienced parliamentarians from other countries would eschew and likely be insulted by such topics. But this is what is truly needed in BiH PA—Parliamentarism 101, so to speak. The lack of understanding of the very functions of a parliament have a terrible effect on the functioning of the parliamentary secretariat/apparatus. Members of parliament tend to be more concerned about how many drivers they will have rather than whether there is a competent parliamentary apparatus (and parliamentary services, such as a parliamentary research branch) to serve them.²⁷

A PLACE FOR INSTITUTION-BUILDING IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Is there a role for institution-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina in light of the arguments made above? I would argue that indeed there is. The above arguments constitute the critical institutional context for working in Bosnia rather than a case against such work.

(1) Building linkages between civil society and parliament

Obviously one of the areas in which a large amount of Western resources has been allocated has been in building a robust civil society, represented by NGOs. According to McMahon, these “democracy NGOs” are:

believed to be vital for Bosnia's transformation, because they represent diverse social interests and will hold the state accountable for its actions. NGOs of this kind act as transmission belts, carrying information from citizens to their government, and from the government to its citizens. In Bosnia they help mitigate extreme positions, undermine ethnic nationalism, and create a culture of tolerance.²⁸

While the proliferation of such organizations is a positive development (although wrought with problems since most of them, just as in the case of Dayton, are not organic but rather created and mostly funded by the West), the ties between Bosnia-Herzegovina's 400-or-so fledgling NGOs and its political institutions are extremely weak. One area of institutional development that is sorely needed is to develop linkages between NGOs and Parliament. One such example would be strengthening the involvement of NGOs in the budget process and in budget consultations. Strengthening such linkages would allow access to the political process and legitimize the viewpoint of parliament vis-à-vis the OHR.²⁹

(2) Raising awareness about the functions of parliament

While no parliamentarian likes a Democracy 101 lecture, there seems to be a very real need for thorough training on the role of members of parliament in contributing to good governance. If the BiH PA is to become a strong state institution, it will require members of parliament who are versed in the functioning of parliamentary committees, the services required by members of parliament to contribute effectively to the parliamentary process, and how to develop relations with other branches of government, especially the executive branch. Again, with no democratic template, democracy is being built from scratch.

One relevant example is the development of capacity in the area of parliamentary oversight. Establishing a stronger oversight role for parliament and ensuring its participation in increasing transparency and accountability of government will not be easy, but it is critical. Historically, parliaments did not play a strong role in controlling the work of the executive branch and in performing such tasks as budgetary oversight. The entire system of checks and balances did not exist in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. Parliamentarians continue to envisage their primary role as legislators, passing legislation that has been introduced by the executive branch. The oversight function is only in its embryonic stages. Hence, the importance of spreading awareness about these important functions.

(3) Promoting self-sufficiency by strengthening capacity

Any actions that will help to promote the self-sufficiency of Bosnia's institutions of governance will contribute to the development of an exit strategy for the international community (though I admit this is certainly an oversimplification). Despite the imperfections present in Dayton, Bosnia is getting its first real chance to experiment with democratic political structures. Any capacity developed in parliament that strengthens its role in contributing to governance has, in my opinion, the potential to promote self-sufficiency in the institutions of governance. Using the comments I made above about a research branch as an example, a research branch is strongly desired (and deemed a high priority) by the staff of the BiH PA, who feel that it could make a significant contribution to the value-added work of parliament once members of parliament understand the importance of creating such a unit. As

a parliamentary development organization, assisting the parliament in the creation of capacity in the form of parliamentary research, legal analysis and other such functions would be particularly useful.

Another relevant example pertains to the strengthening of the parliamentary oversight function of the BiH PA. Parliament's limited oversight role in the BiH PA is exacerbated by the fact that many Balkan countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, are new states with little institutional infrastructure. These parliaments lack the resources required to perform a parliamentary oversight role. Specialized research capacity to examine or investigate government misappropriation or corruption within the executive branch often comes from independent government agencies (such as an ombudsman's office and a Supreme Audit Institution). It is therefore important to strengthen the links between parliament and these institutions. Currently, the Finance Committee, which has the mandate to examine the reports, lacks experts and expertise to do so. Statistical data and the ability to read statistical data are critical. Thorough training is required to use the information technology that would be required. In addition, the Budget and Finance Committee is served only by a Secretary of the Committee, who, despite his competence, is overloaded with administrative tasks, and needs to split his remaining attention between adoption of the budget and consideration of the Supreme Audit Institution reports.³⁰ While seminars will be an important mode of transmitting the message about the importance of playing an oversight role, without increasing the capacity of the Parliament, little will change.

CONCLUSION

Bosnia-Herzegovina's history is wrought by tragedy. Its democracy is frail, in the absence of national unity, prior history of statehood and prior democratic templates to guide it. One of the keys for the existence of democracy in Bosnia will be to develop a parliament that can contribute to and play a value-added role in the governance system. Building linkages between civil society and parliament, raising awareness about the functions of parliament and promoting self-sufficiency are just some of the necessary tools that can help the parliament play that value-added role.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is for all intents and purposes a federal protectorate. It is not difficult to blame the West for so many of the mistakes that it has made in trying to guide Bosnia-Herzegovina to some semblance of peace and stability. At the same time, many parliamentarians in Bosnia-Herzegovina are 'all talk and no action' because they know at the end of the day the OHR will impose a political solution on them. Only when government institutions have developed their own capacity and competence will politicians actually have to take responsibility for governing their state.

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NOTES

- ¹ Taken from Kenneth M. Dye and Rick Staphenurst. Pillars of Integrity: The Importance of Supreme Audit Institutions in Curbing Corruption, an Economic Development Institute Working Paper, Washington, D.C.. Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, 1998.
- ² See Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds. "The Failure of Presidential Democracy". Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, c1994.
- ³ Sabrina P. Ramet. Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991. 2nd ed. Indiana University Press. Bloomington. 1992, p. 74.
- ⁴ John A. Armstrong. "Ukrainian Nationalism". Columbia University Press, New York, 1963, p. 11.
- ⁵ Pridham and Lewis, 1996, p. 1
- ⁶ Samuel Huntington. "A New Era in Democracy. Democracy's Third Wave". Journal of Democracy, Spring 1991, p. 12.
- ⁷ Samuel P. Huntington. "The Future of the Third Wave", in Bernard E. Brown, *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*. 9th edition. Harcourt College Publishers. USA, p. 223.
- ⁸ Dankwart Rustow. "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model". Comparative Politics, April 1970, p. 358.
- ⁹ Gerard Braunthal. "The Federal Republic of Germany", in Joel Krieger, ed., "The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World". Oxford University Press. 2nd ed. Oxford, 2001, pp. 321-22.
- ¹⁰ Dankwart Rustow. "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model", p. 350.
- ¹¹ Patrice C. McMahon. "What Have We Wrought? Assessing International Involvement in Bosnia". Problems of Post-Communism. January-February 2002, p. 20.
- ¹² Ibid, p. 23.
- ¹³ Ronald L. Hatchett. "Bosnia and Herzegovina", p. 78.
- ¹⁴ Patrice C. McMahon. "What Have We Wrought? Assessing International Involvement in Bosnia", p.23.
- ¹⁵ ibid.
- ¹⁶ ibid.
- ¹⁷ Ronald L. Hatchett. "Bosnia and Herzegovina". p. 78.
- ¹⁸ Sabrina P. Ramet. Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, p. 74.
- ¹⁹ Stephen L. Burg & Paul S. Shoup. "The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina . Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention". M.E. Sharpe Publishers. London, 1999, p. 43.
- ²⁰ Patrice C. McMahon. "What Have We Wrought? Assessing International Involvement in Bosnia", p.24.
- ²¹ ibid.
- ²² This chapter relies heavily upon a literature review conducted by David Chandler, in "Bosnia. Faking Democracy After Dayton". Pluto Press. London. 1999, pp. 27-33.
- ²³ David Chandler, in "Bosnia. Faking Democracy After Dayton", p. 29.
- ²⁴ See Ronald L. Hatchett. "Bosnia and Herzegovina", p. 78; and American Committee To Save Bosnia. "Convoy Bosnia - A Summary of the Crisis in Bosnia". Online at <http://www.540.com/bosnia/briefings/crisis.html>.
- ²⁵ Juan J. Linz and Albert Stepan. "Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation". The Johns Hopkins University Press. Baltimore. 1996, p. 25.
- ²⁶ David Chandler, in "Bosnia. Faking Democracy After Dayton", p. 32.
- ²⁷ Personal observation, based on three trips to the BiH PA in 2001.
- ²⁸ Patrice C. McMahon. "What Have We Wrought? Assessing International Involvement in Bosnia", p.21.
- ²⁹ ibid.
- ³⁰ Based on personal observation and extensive interviews conducted in the BiH PA with staff and parliamentarians.